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THE UTILITY OF THE CLOSE CORPORATION
IN ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION*
Donald H. Kelley*
I. Introduction
A. Background
Since the basic juridical validity of the family corporation was recognized in
the leading English decision of Salomon v. Salomon & Co., the family or "close"
corporation has become increasingly significant as a business and property hold-
ing form. There has been a continued trend by statute and judicial decision to
distinguish between the closely held corporation and the publicly held corpora-
tion.
The availability and the utility of the corporate form of doing business to
the sole proprietor or family group has been further emphasized by the recent
statutory trend to allow incorporation by one or more persons with a like number
of directors,2 the enactment of the Subchapter S provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code,' the adoption in some states of legislation specifically tailored to
the close corporation,4 and the recent trend toward permitting the incorporation
of professional persons and associations.5
As the Supreme Court of Illinois has recently stated in Galler v. Galler,
"there has been a definite, albeit inarticulate, trend toward eventual judicial
treatment of the close corporation as sui generis" 6 The courts can no longer fail
to distinguish expressly between the close and public issue corporation when con-
fronted by problems relating to either.
As the basic principle that the closely held corporation shall be for all
purposes treated as having a vitality of its own has come to have accepted com-
mercial applications, so has a comparable principle entered into the development
* Mr. Donald H. Kelley is a partner in the law firm of Kelley and Wallace, North Platte,
Nebraska.
1 [1896] A.C. 22 rev'g Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] Ch. 323. Salomon had in-
corporated his business, taking back certain secured debentures and all the corporate stock,
except one share each to his wife and children. Arguments that the corporation was only a
sham, or Salomon's alter ego, were rejected, and the fundamental principle was established by
the House of Lords that de jure formation creates a distinct legal person regardless of the
interdependence of the incorporators. See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 36.
2 Scriggins and Rees, Developments in State Corporation Law--1970, 26 Bus. LAWYER
1751, 1767 (1971).
3 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 1371 et seq.
4 MD. ANN. CODE, AR'. 23, §§ 100 to 111; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1371. Legislation
in other states containing provisions directed toward the special needs of close corporations
is discussed in detail at 1 F. O'Neal, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.14a (1971); e.g., the NORTH
CAROLINA BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT permitting managerial acts by agreement of the
shareholders without possibility of partnership liability. (Professor O'Neal's two-volume work
encompasses in exhaustive fashion the background, unique aspects, and planning of the close
corporation.)
5 The capitulation of the Service to the uniform attitude of the courts that state law
governs the validity of professional corporations illustrates the vitality of the corporate form
where the substance of the business is really that of a proprietorship or partnership.
6 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (1965).
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of the Estate and Gift Tax Law. As the widespread use of corporate stock as a
medium for transferring the beneficial ownership of the property underlying the
stock has developed, so have approaches to the valuation of the stock as an entity
distinct from the underlying assets. As a consequence, there has been increasing
recent use of the close corporation as a deliberate estate planning vehicle under
circumstances where business reasons alone might not be sufficient to motivate the
incorporation.
7
Recent decisions emphasizing the effect of the size of the stockholding in a
close corporation upon the valuation of that stock and clarifying the degree of
control which can be retained by a donor of such stock without the imposition
of estate tax upon the donated stock further indicate the productive possibilities of
using the corporate form specifically for estate tax planning purposes. Recent
trends in this field have further pointed out the utility of the close corporation
as a vehicle which can be expressly designed for the transmission of property
from one generation to another. The unique attributes of the closely held corpo-
ration provide certain unique opportunities and unique problems in estate
planning.
B. Judicial Recognition of the "Estate Corporation"
The recently decided case of Britt v. United States' has firmly emphasized,
restated, and refined the standards by which a corporation organized primarily
for property or estate planning purposes will be upheld. The Britt case restates
the judicial developments since Moline Properties v. Comm.! and reverses a
district court decision failing to recognize the validity of the corporations in-
volved. In Moline Properties it was stated that the purpose of the incorporation
is immaterial since, "so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business activity
or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation
remains a separate taxable entity."1
In the Britt case the taxpayers, who were partners in a citrus grove business,
formed three corporations into which they distributed certain percentages of their
partnership shares. Stock of the corporations was in turn given to two children
of one of the partners and a sister of the partners. They maintained meticulous
corporate and tax records; the corporation joined in the partnership notes; and
dividends were paid from the partnership to the corporations. The corporations
engaged in no other "business activity." The corporations were admittedly
formed for the purpose of facilitating the transfer to the Britt children of interests
in the partnership and had no other motivation. The argument was made that
the corporation should be disregarded and the income taxed to the stockholders
as if they were individually partners in the business. The Government argued that
the corporations had "rather inconsequential activities"'1 and should be ignored
for that reason. The court, in holding to the contrary, asserted that while business
7 See Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227 '(5th Cir. 1970), reV'g Britt v. United States,
292 F. Supp. 6 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
8 Id.
9 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
10 Id. at 439.
11 431 F.2d at 237.
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activity is required for recognition of the corporation as a separate taxable entity,
the activity may be minimal.
In 1960 the Second Circuit in Commissioner u. State-Adams Corporation2
was presented with the question of recognition for income tax purposes of a corpo-
ration, the only asset of which was a long-term lease to a department store. The
lease was assigned to the corporation in return for its promissory note payable to
the prior lessor for life with the interest being equivalent to the amount of rent.
The only activities of the corporation were the holding of the lease and the taking
of steps necessary to continue its corporate existence. Britt summarized the hold-
ing in State-Adams, as follows:
The Court held that a corporation formed to facilitate the devolution of
property, which merely holds title, collects rent from lessees and distributes
the income has engaged in business and will be taxed as a separate entity. s
The Britt case characterized the previous cases where a corporate entity was
disregarded as occurring when either "the taxpayer has conducted business as if
he and the corporation were one and the same" or "artificial corporations have
been created to contravene directly or indirectly the policies of the Internal
Revenue Code."14 The corporation used as a concealment of or conduit to a
transaction otherwise taxable in order to disguise its taxability may be disregarded
under the principle established by Gregory v. Helvering."5 In that case the
Supreme Court refused to recognize the existence of a corporation formed for
the sole purpose of facilitating a corporate reorganization designed in form to
conceal the real substance of the transaction and thereby contrived to avoid an
otherwise appropriate income tax. This is an application of a more general con-
cept enunciated in United States v. Barwin Realty Co.,' that corporate form will
not be permitted for the purpose of evading the law or interposed to defeat
justice. The taxpayer, however, in transferring his property into the hands of
other parties may legitimately choose the corporate form in which to do so. The
Britt case and cases cited therein establish that a corporation formed for the sole
purpose of facilitating the passage of property is not necessarily a device for the
frustration of the Internal Revenue Code, and may serve as a legitimate vehicle
for implementing a plan of tax avoidance where the criteria for treatment as a
separate entity are otherwise adhered to.
II. Planning Advantages and Opportunities Provided by the Close Corporation
The essential objectives of any estate plan may be simply stated as the utiliza-
tion of the legal devices provided by society for the holding of rights and property
during one's life and the transmission of the same following one's death in order
to pass such property rights to the desired persons in the desired proportions with
the least reduction in the amount of such property through taxes and transmis-
12 283 F.2d 395 (2d Gir. 1960); cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961).
13 431 F.2d at 237 (emphasis supplied).
14 Id. at 233.
15 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
16 25 F.2d 1003 _(E.D.N.Y. 1928).
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sion expenses as is consistent with the other objectives sought. In certain situa-
tions a close corporation (or the close corporation together with the use of trusts
holding the corporate stock) may serve as a uniquely efficient medium for ac-
complishing the succession of property upon death. The facets of the estate plan
with respect to which the planner may find the corporate form useful are analyzed
below.
A. Transmission of Property
Like the trust, the corporation may be used to create future interests in
assets which do not otherwise lend themselves to the same (such as changing
business inventory, depreciable tools and equipment, livestock or any other assets
which are regularly replaced because of short life or business resale). Thus, a
growing business may be held intact and transmitted through several generations
with allowance for various family contingencies with the corporation. It is then a
business operated in a business form, thus avoiding the inhibitions of trust man-
agement which might place a business at a competitive disadvantage even with a
trustee who could be induced to accept the hazards of operating it. Self-renewing
property, such as livestock, which is not susceptible to the creation of legal life
estates, may still need to be transmitted through more than one person because
of its continuity of life. Corporate stock representing the ownership of such
property lends itself to the creation of life estates and remainders, powers of ap-
pointment, and forms of contingent ownership.
B. Estate Tax Avoidance
The persistent present inflation in property values continually increases the
impact on the estate of both state and federal death taxes except where personal
service forms the predominant earning power. Scarcely any business is capable of
providing for a family with an investment of less than the $120,000.00 of total
specific exemptions available to both husband and wife under the Federal
Estate Tax. As the United States Treasury becomes ever more significant
in its role as an unwelcome forced heir, the number of estates reaching the size on
which substantial efforts to disinherit the Treasury are worthwhile becomes in-
creasingly larger. The businessman or landowner whose estate is beginning,
through his own efforts and through the inflation of values, to face substantial
death taxes may find incorporation of those holdings of particular use in achiev-
ing a minimization of death tax. Corporate stock may be of particular con-
venience in achieving the maximum marital deduction since life estates in the
wife can be readily created in assets not otherwise lending themselves to use in
maximizing the marital deduction (such as where the bulk of husband's assets are
in a going business). The use of corporate stock to achieve the maximum marital
deduction may allow both a convenient continuity for the family business and
either facilitate the use of, or make possible the avoidance of the complexity of
marital deduction formula distributions.
Further uses which have been made of the corporate form in death tax
minimization are: (1) future growth or inflationary increase in value of assets
[Vol. 49:334]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
may be channeled to the shares given to donees through multiclass stock arrange-
ments; (2) gifts of minority stock which reduce the gross estate of the donor,
without substantial effect on the donor's ability to govern the operation of the
corporate assets; and (3) it may now be possible for substantial blocks of gift stock
to be placed in trusts of which the donor is either trustee or may otherwise con-
trol the voting power of the stock; the corporate form presents a unique capa-
bility, at this time, for the retention of control over the donor's assets by him
while still divesting his estate of taxable value in the same.
C. Estate Administration
Incorporated assets are for all practical purposes administered through the
corporation by the directors and officers elected by the stockholders. The ex-
ecutor of the estate of the deceased stockholder is still only a stockholder. He
accounts to the probate court only for the value of the stock and dividends which
he receives. It is necessary for him to go to the probate court for instruction
only to the extent the voting of his stock involves difficult decisions warranting
the request for instructions. No accounting to the probate court for the receipts
and expenditures of the corporation relating to its business or other underlying
assets need be made except to the extent necessary for the determination of
tax liabilities. The operation of the assets or going business involved may thus
be conducted with greater privacy than is the case with the proprietary asset
holdings the extent and income of which must become matters of public record
in the probate court. The officers of the corporation may conduct the business of
the corporation and buy and sell its underlying assets without the necessity of
requesting permission from the probate court for any particular action and with-
out the extraordinary fiduciary responsibilities which they would face if operating
as executor of such assets independent of the corporate form.17 As a result, estate
administration may be greatly simplified and an otherwise unobtainable con-
tinuity of business operation may be achieved 8
The techniques and legal background relating to the implementation of the
above possibilities are more fully discussed below.
D. "Going Public" as Part of the Estate Plan
A transmission of the family assets or family business from one generation
to another for purposes of preservation of the same in kind, or as the transmission
of a going business is primarily the subject matter to which this work is directed.
Nevertheless, in certain situations it is necessary for estate liquidity or desirable
for the objectives to be achieved by the testator and his family, that the testator's
ownership in the family corporation be reduced to cash either in whole or in
part. This need may be approached through variations of buy-sell agreements
whereby stockholders who will be continuing to operate are obliged to purchase
17 This approach may be extended to another level by the testator through the medium
of leaving property to a corporation directed by his will to be formed by his executor. Such
a device may be used in lieu of a testamentary trust. Note, Estate Planning for the Close Cor-
poration, 51 MiNN. L. Rav. 725 (1967).
18 See Younger, Death and the Close Corporation, 34 BROOKLYN LAw R viaw 1 '(1967).
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the shares of heirs who will not be involved in the operation. This is familiar
ground for estate planners. In those family businesses where suitable, an alter-
native approach is to attempt a private or public offering of stock in order to
establish a market into which stock entering the testator's estate may be intro-
duced."9
III. Estate Tax Avoidance Through the Estate Corporation
The holding by a decedent of stock in a family corporation and the gifts
of such stock during his lifetime by the decedent result in various possible com-
binations of stock holding and have various effects on valuation of the stock for
estate tax purposes. Factors affecting the valuation of close corporation stock
and cases relating to it are discussed in detail below. To fully appreciate the
opportunities involved, however, it is first necessary to examine the various classes
of people giving and receiving such stock, the relevant percentages of stock
ownership affecting valuation, and the various combinations thereof which arise.
The following outline, for simplicity, treats a family corporation having one
class of voting common stock only. Similar factors would be equally applicable
to corporations having more than one class of stock.
A. First Generation Estate
Stock reserved to the donor after the gift includes reservation to the donor
of more than enough stock to control liquidation of the corporation (usually
two-thirds). The tax effect of this is best illustrated by the Estate of Gregg
Maxc90 case, in which, because of the problems related to corporate liquidation,
stock of this category was discounted by the amount of fifteen percent below the
value of the underlying assets. Incorporation may be particularly helpful where
the assets involved have a low income yield in comparison with their comparative
market values (at present this is the case generally with agricultural holdings).
As to such property application of the factors of corporate stock, valuation may
result in a lower value than valuation purely by comparative sales of comparable
property would.
Reserved holding between fifty-one percent and two-thirds of the stock,
reserving operating control, but not liquidating control also invokes the reason-
ing of the Maxcy case. The fact that this stock holding cannot compel liqui-
dation will have a further decided effect on its valuation. In Obermer v. U.S.,21
a fifty percent stock holding of a corporation having underlying assets capable
of ready liquidity was reduced by one-third below the asset value. The court
laid great stress on the fact that the local law required two-thirds control of the
stock to liquidate the corporation. The court made mention, also, of the expense
19 NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE ESTATE PLANNING STUDIES '(Lincoln, Neb.: Autumn,
1970). Discussion of "going public" as a means of preparing an alternative for the liquidation
of the testator's stockholdings is beyond the scope of this work; however, it has been the subject
of a very interesting study by the trust department of the National Bank of Commerce of
Lincoln, Nebraska, which is available upon request.
20 Estate of Gregg Maxcy, 69 P.-H. Tax Ct. Mem. 158 (1969).
21 238 F. Supp. 29 (D. Hawaii 1964).
[Vol. 49:334]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER[
and capital gain tax attendant to corporate liquidations, which factors would
tend to reduce the value of stock holding at any degree of control. The Obermer
reasoning would appear applicable to any holding not having liquidating control.
This exact situation has now come before the Tax Court. In the Estate of
Ethel C. Dooly, 1"' one of the stockholdings valued was slightly more than 50%
of the stock of a corporation owning ranch land and engaged in the ranching
business. The underlying assets valued at approximately ten ($10) dollars a
share, but the Tax Court determined the value of this block of stock to be five
dollars and twenty-five cents ($5.25) per share. The factors applied by the
Court are best stated in its summary of the testimony of the taxpayer's witness
as follows:
The value ultimately selected by him was somewhat higher than the figures
resulting from the earnings and dividend approaches and somewhat lower
than that based upon asset value, and much of the reduction from asset
value is properly accountable by the appropriate discounts for a minority
interest and for liquidation.21 -2
The Dooly case is thus extremely significant as the first case dearly applying
the relevant factors of earnings, capitalization, degree of control, and liquidating
costs to arrive at a clear cleavage of value between stock controlling a corporation
and the assets owned by the corporation.
Reservation of fifty percent of the stock in the donor is the exact situation
treated of in the Obermer case. Reservation of less than fifty percent of the
stock, whereby the donor is reduced to the position of a minority stockholder,
is within the Estate of Sidney L. Katz22 and similar cases, including Dooly.
To the extent that the donated stock is not includible in the estate of the
decedent under reservations made by the decedent, it is completely removed from
taxability in the first generation estate upon the expiration of the three-year
contemplation of death period. The donated stock given within the three-year
period will still form a taxable part of the decedent's estate, but it will be taxed
not as part of the decedent's original ownership, but as separate and distinct
property. All the factors which would require the discounting of a minority
ownership will apply to this type of stock. The cases appear to value donated
property separately and at the value of the date of death of the donor.28
B. Second Generation Estates
To the extent that stock in the hands of the donee and the heirs of the first
generation individual continues to be minority stock it is subject to all the valua-
tion reductions that may be appropriate to such stock. Stock in the hands of an
individual person of the second generation is clearly at arm's length from the
other stockholders unless unusual facts exist indicating a collusive situation. Its
valuation may therefore be approached without the inhibitions involving the
21.1 31 T.C.M. 814 (1972).
21.2 Id.
22 Estate of Sidney L. Katz, 68 P.-H. Tax Ct. Mem. 171 (1968).
23 McGehee v. Comn'r, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958).
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valuation of stock in the estate of the first generation owner where the possibility
of collusive retention of control by the donor may be present. The valuation of
the stock in the hands of the second generation people will be also much affected
by the existence of restrictive agreements for repurchase by the corporation or
other stockholders. The "Second Generation" situation is equally applicable
to arm's length persons incorporating in the first instance in which each has a
minority interest.
C. The Third Generation
The original planning must take into account what will happen to the stock
in the hands of the third generation either by prescribing it or deliberately ignor-
ing it. For example, the stock may be reconsolidated by restrictive repurchase
or trust arrangement. Also, the stock may become fragmented as it passes down
to various family lines.
The above outline illustrates also that to undertake the lessening of estate
tax impact by gifts of minority stock creates other nontax planning situations
which must be solved. It must be recognized in this context as in all others there
is no medium of estate tax avoidance which is without its price.
IV. Valuation of Minority Stock
It is a common judicial statement that "minority stock interests in a 'closed'
corporation are usually worth much less than the proportionate share of the
assets to which they attach."2 The Regulations recognize the valuation factor
of the degree of control of the business, "either actual or effective,"25 represented
by the block of stock to be valued. Revenue Ruling 59-60, on the valuation of
closely held corporation stock, states that "a minority interest in an unlisted cor-
poration's stock is more difficult to sell than a similar block of listed stock...""
It is becoming continually better recognized by the courts that the latter fact is
massively understated. The increasing impact of the "degree of control" factor
and the parameters of valuation related to it are illustrated in Maxcy and Katz.
In the Maxcy case there were involved the estates of two decedents, one of whom
held 82 out of the 174 shares of the corporation. It was stipulated by the Service
that this holding should be reduced by a twenty-five percent discount below the
attributable underlying asset value. In the Katz case the decedent held shares
amounting to approximately one-fifth of the corporate shares. The court held
that this holding should be discounted by fifty percent to reflect lack of market-
ability resulting from the corporation's not having publicly marketed stock.
"Discount" of minority stock below the attributable value of the underlying
assets within the range indicated by these two cases is now sufficiently common
to require its recognition in estate planning as well as in gross estate valuation.
It is commonly reasoned in the cases on this point that valuation of minority
24 Cravens v. Welch, 10 F. Supp. 94, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
25 TREAS. RXo. § 20.2031-2(e) (1972).
26 Rev. Rul. 59-60 § 4.01(g), 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 242.
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share holdings must be reduced to reflect the lack of control over dividend pay-
ment and the lack of control over corporate liquidation.'
A. Valuation Regulations
The basic theory of the Federal Estate Tax should not be lost sight of in
valuing stock of a closely held corporation. In the valuation of assets of a dece-
dent subject to the tax, the Internal Revenue Code provides that a tax is imposed
on the transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent.' "Taxable" is defined
as the gross estate less the exemptions and deductions allowed by law, while the
gross estate is defined as the value at the time of death of all property, real or
personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.'
The tax is imposed as a true "estate tax," not upon what the heirs receive,
but upon the assets as they were in the hands of the decedent. It is elementary,
therefore, that other stock in the hands of the heir could not be taken into
account in valuing what he receives, and other stock previously given by the
donor cannot be taken into account in valuing what he has retained. It is only
the fair market value of the block of stock held by the decedent as such block
could be marketed at the date of his death, which forms part of the gross estate.
The regulations relating to the valuation of stocks and bonds state that the
fair market value is to be determined by taking into consideration in the case of
shares of stock, the company's net worth, prospective earning power and dividend
paying capacity, and other relevant factors."0 Some of the other relevant factors
referred to are the goodwill of the business, the economic outlook in the partic-
ular industry, the company's position in the industry and its management, and
the degree of control of the business represented by the block of stock to be
valued. 1
B. Revenue Ruling 59-60
In implementation of Section 2031 and the Regulations adopted under it,
Revenue Ruling 59-60"s was issued. This ruling sets forth in elaborate detail
the accepted and recognized appraisal practices for the valuation of stock in a
closely held corporation where there is no market in the stock from which to
draw direct evidence of market value. If there is one principle abundantly clear
from the ruling, it is that valuation of such stock must be a blend of all the
relevant factors bearing upon the ultimate reality of what would happen to the
actual shares of stock to be valued in the market place as of the date of valuation.
No one factor is to be predominant; net worth is only one relevant factor in
reaching the ultimate determination of value. In this regard, the following fea-
tures of this ruling are particularly notable:
27 Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710 '(D. Conn. 1954).
28 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2001.
29 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2051, 2031(a).
30 TREAs. REG. §§ 20.2031, 20.2032.
31 Id.
32 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 242.
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(Section 2) .01 Mhe property to be included in the gross estate, . . .
shall be taxed on the basis of the property at the time of death of the
decedent, . . . .
.02 [Tjhe Estate Tax Regulations . . . define fair market value, in
effect, as the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller when the former is not under any compul-
son to buy and the latter is not under any compulsion to sell, both parties
having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.
(Section 3) .01 No formula can be devised which will be generally
applicable to the multitude of different valuation issues arising in estate
and gift tax cases. A sound valuation will be based upon all the relevant
facts.
(Section 4) .01 [I]n the valuation of the stock of closely held corpora-
tions... [t]he following factors, although not all-inclusive are fundamental
and require careful analysis in each case:
(a) The nature of the business and history of the enterprise from its in-
ception;
(b) The economic outlook .. . of the specific industry....
(c) The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business.
(d) The earning capacity of the company
(g) Sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to be valued.33
The ruling also sets forth the items of evidence which establish the appli-
cability and weight of each of the above factors, including the following: 1. "[A]
study of the growth and net income of the business, ... the nature of the busi-
ness, its products or services, its operating and investment assets, capital structure,
plant facilities, sales records, and management," 2. "[]urrent and prospective
economic conditions as of the date of the appraisal," 3. "[T]he effect of the loss
of the manager on the future expectancy of the business," 4. "[A]nnual state-
ments for two or more years immediately preceding the appraisal," which balance
sheets will disclose evidence of liquid position, gross and net book value, working
capital, long-term indebtedness, capital structure, and net worth, 5. "Detailed
profit and loss statements should be obtained and considered for a representative
period... ," and 6. "The size of the block of stock itself is a relevant factor to be
considered." 4
The Revenue Ruling clearly recognizes that a minority interest in an un-
listed corporation's stock is more difficult to sell than a similar block of listed
stock. This factor is characterized in some cases as a lack of "marketability.""5
0. Net Worth
The net worth of a closely held corporation is one (but only one) of the
factors contemplated by the relevant regulations, rulings, and cases relating to
the valuation of shares of stock in a closely held corporation. The mere fact of
incorporation, regardless of the division of stock ownership, makes the multiple
valuation factors of Revenue Ruling 59-60 applicable. Properly weighing the
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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various factors indicated by Revenue Ruling 59-60 can result in a substantially
different measure of value for the stock after incorporation than would be typi-
cally applied by the Revenue Service in the course of estate tax audit to the
assets without incorporation. For example, land is uniformly approached by the
Internal Revenue Service in the course of audit on the basis of comparative sales
only without any adjustment for low earning capacity if such be the case. At
the present time agricultural land, in general, appears to have values inflated in
the market place beyond anything which the earning capacity of the land will
justify. Since there are no regulations bearing specifically upon the value of real
estate, it is difficult to counter the argument that it should be valued solely for
what it will sell for. If the same real estate is incorporated, there at least become
available the elaborate regulations and rulings relating to the valuation of corpo-
rate stock from which to argue that more weight should be given to the income
capitalization factor that is normally the case in land valuation by the Internal
Revenue Service.
Further, if the stock to be valued represents less than an interest which can
compel liquidation (typically, a two-thirds ownership of issued and outstanding
stock) or represents an interest less than that which can control operation of the
corporation (fifty-one percent would be required to dominate the Board of Direc-
tors) many factors other than the net worth of the corporation enter very realis-
tically into the valuation of the shares. The relevance of the net worth of the
corporation to the value of stock not having liquidating control has been delin-
eated as follows:
The liquidating value, however, is not a sound measure for valuing shares
in a going concern, especially minority shares. [Citation omitted.] In
Mathilda B. Hooper [41 B.T.A. 114], we said: "A prospective buyer would
give some consideration to the book value of a $145.00 share. He would
realize, however, that the company was a going concern and that even if it
be assumed the book value could be realized upon liquidation of the corpo-
ration, there was no indication that it was to be liquidated. Moreover, he
would also realize that 'minority stock interests in a "closed" corporation
are usually worth much less than the proportionate share of the assets to
which they attach." ,
In the case just quoted the court valued the stock at almost fifty percent less
than book value.
The above analysis is substantially that adopted by the Tax Court in the
Estate of Ethel C. Dooly.8 6"  This opinion deserves particularly close study by a
practitioner contemplating estate tax planning through the close corporation
form or otherwise valuing close corporation stock. As therein stated by the Tax
Court:
The respondent (Internal Revenue Service), in essence, contends that the
stock valuation should be based solely on the value of the assets of Island
36 Estate of Charles W. Heppenstall, 49 P.-H. T.C. Memo 115, 121 (1949) (emphasis sup-
plied).
36.1 31 T.C.M. 814 (1972).
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Ranching***under similar circumstances this court has refused to uphold
the respondent's determination that the value of stock of an operating
corporation should be determined solely on the basis of asset value.30.2
The taxpayer in the Dooly case submitted the testimony of appraisers valu-
ing the assets utilized in the ranching business of the corporation with the greatest
weight being given to comparative sales. Taxpayer then offered a further witness
experienced in the marketing of corporate shares who approached valuation of
the stock in question first through capitalizing the corporate income at a typical
rate of return required by investors in business, and weighting the same with the
asset value; and then arriving at the value of the stock blocks by further weight-
ing the factors of degree of control and problems related to liquidation. The Tax
Court expressly countenanced addition of the earnings factor, where the corpo-
rate stock is involved as opposed to physical property valuation only, stating:
"Thus in ascertaining the fair market value of the stock of Island Ranching, both
earnings and asset value should be considered. "
D. Earning Power
Since a corporation is valued as a going entity for the purpose of reaching
the valuation of shares, the earning power and the dividend paying capacity of
the corporation are necessarily involved. Earning power is approached by the
cases after the manner of the income capitalization approach of appraisal to
real estate valuation. The two factors involved in income capitalization valua-
tion are: the income of the business or real estate entity involved and the rate
of capitalization to be used in determining the underlying value which that in-
come justifies. Revenue Ruling 59-60 outlines the factors to be taken into ac-
count in determining a capitalization rate. The Ruling states in part:
In the application of certain fundamental valuation factors, such as earn-
ings and dividends, it is necessary to capitalize the average or current results
at some appropriate rate. Among the more important factors to take into
consideration in deciding upon a capitalization rate in a particular case are:
(1) the nature of the business; (2) the risk involved; and (3) the stability
or irregularity of earnings.87
Revenue Ruling 68-609 further expands the techniques of applying the in-
come capitalization method as a factor of valuation (particularly where this ap-
proach would produce an intangible value in excess of the market value of the
tangible assets involved)."' This ruling suggests the use of a base period of not
less than five years immediately prior to the valuation date and application of
the capitalization rate to the average earnings for the base period. It further
suggests determination of separate capitalization rates for establishing earnings
from intangible assets and tangible assets. This ruling suggests a rate of return
36.2 Id.
36.3 Id.
37 Rev. Rul. 59-60 § 6, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 243.
38 Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 327.
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on tangible assets of eight to ten percent when an accepted industry-wide per-
centage is not available and suggests a rate of return on intangible assets of fifteen
to twenty percent. The rate used would depend upon the hazards and risks of
the business and the stability of earnings.
In the Dooly case, the Internal Revenue Service attempted to blunt the
effect of interjection of the earning power factor by arguing that the capitaliza-
tion rate should reflect only the average rate of return in the agricultural industry.
The taxpayer's witness had used a seven percent capitalization rate. The Service
submitted testimony that the average rate of return on a ranching operation in
Utah where the ranch in question was located is around two percent. The Tax
Court disposed of this argument as follows:
The respondent, therefore, suggests that a 2% capitalization rate should be
used. Yet, the capitalization rate and the average rate of return on capital
are not the same. The capitalization rate is the rate of return in which an
investor is willing to invest his funds, taking into consideration the risk
factor involved and the investment being contemplated. Dewing, Financial
Policy of Corporations 288 (5th edition 1953). Thus, in determining the
capitalization rate, an investor would take into account the rate of "riskless"
investment and add in an allowance for the risk involved and the particular
investment being contemplated***because the petitioner's appraisers used
a capitalization rate which is within the realm of reason, and because there
was no evidence indicating that a lower rate should be used, we uphold
the petitioner's use of the 7% rate.38"1
The Tax Court thus establishes that the valuation of close corporate stock is to
be approached as an intangible related to the requirements of the investing com-
munity, rather than as a tangible asset related to the income acceptable to oper-
atom in the industry involved. In other words, land, or other assets, may be
purchased at a value reflective of psychological considerations, but the purchaser
of stock must take into account as a factor the limitations which that stock places
between him and the asset involved.
E. Degree of Control
The degree of control was the substantial factor in the case of Whittemore
v. Fitzpatrick?3 In valuing blocks of 200 shares out of 820 shares, the court
reached a valuation of thirty-four percent of the proportionate value of the
underlying corporate assets based substantially upon the factors that a minority
shareholder cannot control dividend payment and cannot control corporate
liquidation. There are many cases bearing upon the effect of control on valua-
tion of stock and the statement is regularly quoted that "minority interests in a
closed corporation are usually worth much less than the proportionate share of
the assets to which they attach."4
The factor of control was applied to even fifty percent ownership in Ober-
38.1 31 T.J.M. 814 '(1972).
39 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954).
40 Cravens v. Welch, 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954).
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mer v. United States. 1 In that case the block of stock to be valued consisted of
100 shares of an investment company which had 200 shares issued and out-
standing. The corporation involved was a personal holding company necessarily
compelled to distribute all its annual earnings. The assets of the company con-
sisted of liquid bonds and certificates of deposit of $189,000 and common stocks
of $1,228,000, against which there were outstanding debentures of the company
totaling $350,575, with accrued interest. The underlying nature of the situation
was, therefore, that of readily marketable assets having a more or less regular
income not subject to the risks and hazards of assets consisting of either real
estate or an operating business. The court mentioned problems relating to the
retirement of the debentures and the capital gains tax upon stock sale necessary
to retire the debentures. The predominant factor, however, in valuation was
stated to be that of control, and the court made reference to the local law re-
quiring two-thirds control of the stock to liquidate the corporation. The court
held the block of stock involved should be valued at two-thirds of the adjusted
book value (net worth) of the corporation.
The Maxcy and Katz cases discussed above illustrate recent positions of the
tax court on the application of the degree of control factor. In the Katz case
this factor was also verbalized as having relation to the "marketability" of the
minority stock interest there involved. If there is a ready market for the shares
of stock being valued, the prices established in that market govern. The discus-
sion of this section is related to those situations where there is no ready market
for the stock, particularly where the stock is held only in the hands of a single
family. Minority quantities of stock are, from the strict viewpoint of the market-
place, worthless. Typically in family corporations there is little, if any, dividend
distribution, profits are distributed primarily through salaries, and management
is thoroughly centralized in the hands of one or a few people. A stockholder
having less than one-third of the stock of such a corporation has no bargaining
power whatever except for the amount of nuisance he is willing to make of him-
self in terms of lawsuits alleging abuse of his position as a minority stockholder.
If the corporation has a low income to assets ratio and any sort of realistic
need for accumulation of this income, his position would be unlikely to bear any
fruit in the course of litigation. In this light, the heavy discount from valuation
of underlying assets made in the Katz case is not only realistic but may well
result in a value that is somewhat optimistic.
On this point, the testimony of the valuation expert testifying for the Inter-
nal Revenue Service in Righter v. United States42 is particularly significant. The
witness testified that since the stock in question was not publicly traded, it "lacked
marketability. ' 43 He stressed that "the three hundred thirty-seven share block
being evaluated represented only a minority interest '44 (the block involved was
seventeen percent of the stock of the corporation). The witness also stressed that
the corporation was in a highly competitive business with some risk. The witness
felt that a discount of approximately forty-five to fifty percent in the hypothetical
41 238 F. Supp. 29 (D. Hawaii 1964).
42 439 F.2d 1204 (Ct. CI. 1971).
43 Id. at 1213.
44 Id. at 1214.
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selling price of the stock was warranted by reason of these factors.
The Righter case also illustrates another aspect of minority stock valuation
in that the price from which the expert worked in determining the minority stock
discount was determined by the application of the general ratio of stock price to
book value prevalent in the industry to the book value of the particular corpora-
tion being appraised. Such industry-wide averages, if available and if properly
comparative, may be of assistance in determining the aspects of intangible valua-
tion of a corporation.
The Court of Claims has again given substantial weight to the degree of
control factor in the recent case Smith v. United States.4 5 In this case the
corporation engaged in a home remodeling business that had losses for four
of the previous five years, but the value of the corporation's real estate had
been increasing. The net worth of the corporation averaged about $144.00
a share; the deceased owned 41.4 percent of the issued and outstanding stock
of the corporation. The Revenue Service admitted that the decedent's shares
were worth about twenty percent less than the net worth per share, or $118.00 a
share. The state took the position that the decedent's holdings were worth no
more than $75.00 per share. The court held the correct value to be $84.10,
thereby allowing approximately a forty percent reduction from net worth. The
court reasoned that in the absence of any actively traded comparable companies,
no objective comparison of market value as related to earnings, dividends, and
book value was possible. Primary weight was given to the fact that the equity in-
terest was a minority interest. The court noted that a "prospective investor would
be unable to force the payment of a dividend or the liquidation of the com-
pa fny."4
6
The degree of control considerations discussed above culminate in the Dooly
case, which involves blocks of both slightly over 50% and under 10% of the
outstanding stock of the corporation involved. The Tax Court in approving the
values placed on the stock by the taxpayer's witness (as that testimony is discussed
above) stated:
Both blocks of stock were valued with the understanding that neither block
represented power sufficient to liquidate the corporation, and the difference
between the value of the majority and the minority block is due to the fact
that the holder of the majority block could control the operation of the
business while the holder of the minority block could not do so.46"-
F. Restrictive Transfer Provisions and Purchase Agreements
Regulation 20.2031-2(h) recognizes that amounts of payment fixed by
agreements for the purchase of stock in a closely held corporation govern its
value for Federal Estate Tax purposes provided that the terms of the agreement
to purchase are binding during the lifetime as well as at the death of the share-
holder, and that the agreement must represent "a bona fide business arrange-
45 Ct. Cl., Com. Rept. No. 430-69 (Nov. 11, 1971).
46 Id.
46.1 31 T.C.M. 814 (1972).
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ment and not a device to pass the decedent's shares to the natural objects of his
bounty for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth. '47 The applicable ruling is Revenue Ruling 54-76,4" which states that
when shares in the issuing corporation were acquired by decedent subject to
an option reserved by the issuing corporation to repurchase the stock at a price
therein determined, this price is to be treated as the value of the stock for Federal
Estate Tax purposes. Revenue Ruling 59-60 also recognized that where "shares
of stock were acquired by the decedent subject to an option reserved by the
issuing corporation to repurchase at a certain price, the option price is usually
accepted as the fair market value for estate tax purposes."49 Ruling 59-60 as
the general statement relating to the valuation of shares in closely held corpora-
tions directs that such agreements be considered as one of the factors in valuing
such stock.
In the Estate of Albert L. Salt" the decedent stockholder was required by
a restrictive agreement entered into with the other stockholders of the corporation
to offer the stock for sale to the corporation at the issuing price before transferring
it to third parties. The agreement applied both during his lifetime and to his
estate at his death. The tax court held that the value established by this agree-
ment fixed the valuation of the decedent's shares for Federal Estate Tax pur-
poses. The same principle was applied in the Estate of Orville B. Littick.5' This
case is of particular interest when considered in the context of the use of the
corporate form and corporate stock controls for family business and estate plan-
ning purposes. All shares in the corporation were owned by the members of a
single family who had entered into an agreement providing that the corporation
would buy the shares of any deceased shareholder at a price determined by the
terms of the agreement. The court found that this agreement was entered into
to ensure continuity of ownership of the corporation in the family and stated:
Where, for the purpose of keeping control of a business in its present man-
agement, the owners set up in an arm's-length agreement, . . . the price
at which the interest of a part owner is to be disposed of by his estate to
the other owners, that price controls for estate tax purposes, regardless of
the market value of the interest to be disposed oL52
Any such agreement inhibiting the ability of the taxpayer to reduce his
shares to cash will tend to reduce the valuation of the shares. A third party
would, of course, be unwilling to offer any amount for shares in excess of the
price at which someone has an option to purchase them whether it be the corpo-
ration or other shareholders. If the agreement or option takes the form of requir-
ing a first tender to either a corporation or other stockholders capable of buying
the stock, it operates as an effective restriction against transfer or sale to any
third party; and the amount of the option would have the effect of fixing the
47 TREAS. REG. § 20.2031-2'(1972).
48 Rev. Rul. 54-76, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 194.
49 Rev. Rul. 59-60 § 7, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 243.
50 17 T.C. 92 (1951).
51 31 T.C. 181 (1958).
52 Id. at 187.
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maximum worth of the stock to the holder of it. If the value fixed by the agree-
ment should be very low in relationship to a stock with a high dividend paying
history and the option is exercisable only upon the possibility of transfer to third
parties, a proper fair market value might be in excess of the option figure.
In this last regard, careful attention should be paid to the Estate of Pearl
Gibbons Reynolds." In that case the decedent and the family of the decedent
owned virtually all the units in a voting trust. The voting trust held the majority
of the shares of a life insurance company. Under the terms of a voting trust,
its units could not be sold unless first offered to other holders of units at a price
based upon a formula applied to the company dividends. If refused by the other
unit holders, the units would have to be offered then to the Board of Directors
of the life insurance company at the same formula price. The units could be
transferred, but remained subject to the restriction. The formula price would
result in a value per unit less than the proportionate share of that unit to the
over the counter selling price of the life insurance company's stock forming the
subject matter of the trust. The Tax Court ruled that in determining the units'
fair market value for estate tax purposes, the first offer restrictions were only
"relevant factors"54 to be considered with all other valuation factors, and that
neither the price of the underlying shares nor the formula price represented an
absolute index of the fair market value. It is difficult to reconcile the Reynolds
case with previous tax court cases, and it does inject an element of some uncer-
tainty into the situation.
Stock purchase agreements may arise in the following circumstances:
(1) As an arm's length agreement among several stockholders having
each contributed capital or each purchased stock for value;
(2) As a restriction imposed by a donor or testator upon stock given
to several persons providing for purchase option among themselves;
(3) As an option or restriction reserved to a donor or a corporation in
which the donor retains control, imposed upon gifts of stock to
others; or
(4) As purchase options or various restrictive purchase covenants given
by a donor to other persons whether accompanied by gifts of stock
or otherwise.
The first instance is clearly a "bona fide business arrangement" within the
meaning of the Regulations. The second and third instances are not business
arrangements but nevertheless represent realistic handicaps on the marketability
of the stock in question. In restricting the ability of the donee or legatee to
market his stock, they should, consequently, be recognized as affecting the valua-
tion in his estate.
The fourth instance is apparently the situation attempted to be caught for
estate tax under the Regulations above quoted. A gift of a bona fide legally en-
forceable option to purchase the donor's stock does, however, effectively reduce
53 55 T.C. 172 (1970).
54 Id. at 200.
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or govern the fair market value of that stock in the hands of the donor or his
estate. The proper analysis, therefore, is that a taxable gift takes place to the
extent that the fair market value of the donor's stock before the gift exceeds the
option figure. The stock in the donor's estate should be valued in response to
the outstanding option. If the option is exercisable only at the decedent's death,
it would be the equivalent of a transfer with possession and enjoyment retained
and should not affect the valuation of the property in the decedent's estate. If
it is exercisable during his lifetime, it is difficult to see that there has been any-
thing but an absolute gift of the increment of value above the option price.
Such stock agreements may take various forms whether they form part of
the organic structure of the corporation or are a separate contractual or stock
transfer arrangement among the stockholders, including:
(1) An ability to match the bona fide offer of a third person,
(2) An option to purchase the shares at an agreed price, or price deter-
mined by an agreed formula, within a period of time after notice
by the shareholder that he intends to sell or mortgage his shares if
the option is not exercised,
(3) An option to purchase at an agreed value, or value arrived at by
an agreed formula, upon the death of any shareholder,
(4) An absolute agreement to purchase at such price upon the death
of a shareholder.
Such agreements perform the function of enabling centralized retention of the
stock to take place. They achieve the results of keeping out nonfamily members
and preventing fragmentation of the stock into numerous hands as the stock-
holders pass away.
Extreme care must be taken in fixing the formula for the purchase. If it is
held below market value to deliberately reduce estate tax values or for other
reasons, the result is to create a windfall to the stockholders living the longest.
Thus, an overzealous desire to reduce estate taxes or pass inflationary values to
the surviving stockholders may result in substantial unfairness to the estates of
the earliest decedents. At least, if such a Tontine-like effect is desired it should
be entered into deliberately and not inadvertently. It may be that the corpora-
tion or the survivors cannot be expected to be able to afford to pay the full market
value of the stock of a corporation having low earning power in proportion to
asset value. It thus may be realistic and necessary to relate the purchase formula
to the corporation's earning power rather than its liquidation potential if a realis-
tic ability to reconsolidate stock ownership is desired. Care should be taken to
assure that such purchase options are consistent with the Regulations under
Section 2031. Conceivably an option which was not effective during the lifetime
of the decedent but applied at his death could leave his shares valued at their
full market value, but cause his estate to be either handicapped in paying the
estate tax or facing a difficult apportionment problem. Testamentary options to
purchase are common, and proration of estate tax between the person having
the option and the persons receiving the cash payment ultimately can be made.
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G. Summary
In summarizing the rules of law applicable to the valuation of close corpora-
tion stock, no better statement can be made than the following quotation from
Righter v. United States:
We held in Penn Yan Agway Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 189 Ct.
Cl. 434, 417 F.2d 1372 (1969):
It is a well established rule of law, carefully analyzed and stated in
Drybrough v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky. 1962), that
the market value of common stock in a closely held corporation, there
being no market sales of such stock, must be determined upon con-
sideration of all relevant factors, such as earning capacity, anticipated
profits, book value, and dividend yield. [Emphasis supplied] [Citation
omitted].
We find a similar statement in Arc Realty Co. v. C.I.R., 295 F.2d 98 (8th
Cir. 1961) as follows:
The question of "fair market value," defined to be "the price at which
property would change hands in a transaction between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under compulsion to buy nor to sell
and both being informed," O'Malley v. Ames, 8 Cir., 197 F.2d 256, at
page 257; Fitts Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 8 Cir.,
237 F.2d 729, 731, is one of fact and cannot be established on the basis
of fixed rules or formulae. Among the factors properly to be considered
in making the determination are corporate assets, earnings, dividend
policy, earning power of the corporation, prospects of the corporation,
book value, character of the management, competition and other fac-
tors which an informed purchaser and informed seller would take into
account.55
V. Application of Minority Stock Techniques to the Reduction
of Estate Tax Values
The Service seems to be working toward the general position that the
aggregate value of all outstanding shares of a close corporation will be no less
than the value of the underlying assets. In economic reality the advent of the
corporate form can create a less marketable situation than would exist without
it (for example, the Maxcy case).
Unrelated arm's length minority stockholdings in a close corporation must
each individually be subject to discount in the hands of the respective owners
thereof since a purchaser is afforded the opportunity of being able to deal with
one owner at a time on the basis of the limited market available for that owner's
minority stock. From the estate tax point of view solely, it is possible that one of
the effects of incorporation can be a significant reduction in the fair market
value of the total gross estate of any given owner through the substitution of
minority stock for the ownership of certain defined assets. Some of the various
approaches toward this result are as follows:
55 439 F.2d 1204, 1217-18 (Ct. CL 1971) (Court's emphasis).
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A. Incorporation of business or investment assets by the owner thereof and
gifts of stock to others: The effect of this is to reduce the aggregate value to the
sum of values of stock in the owners' hands. The amount of reduction depends
on the degree of control remaining in the hands of the owner-donor.
B. Restrictive Agreements: The addition of a covenant restricting the right
of the corporate stockholders to sell their stock freely and openly to third parties
necessarily results in a reduction of the value of that stock. It has been regularly
held by the courts that a restriction which provides a specific formula for buy-
back of stock by the corporation or other stockholders during the life of the stock-
holders and which is binding upon death fixes the value of the stock. Any form
of restrictive covenant will probably have a downward effect on the stock value.
The restrictions which may be imposed may take many forms including the
option of the corporation or the stockholders to match a bona fide offer; to pur-
chase the individual stockholder's stock if he offers it for sale, at a formula price;
and to purchase the individual stockholder's stock in the event of his death, at a
formula price. At the extreme, such formulas may fix very low or unrealistic
values on the stock (such as a formula relating the buy-out to the contribu-
tion value of the stockholder's assets when there has been a substantial inflation of
that value). The result may be a Tontine-like effect whereby the survivor of the
initial stockholders or of the "second generation" stockholders may have a con-
siderable windfall. The repurchase agreement may extend to either the corpora-
tion or the stockholders or to the stockholders alone in the event the corporation
does not have sufficient liquid assets to exercise the option.
C. The Creation of Multiclass Stock by the Owner-Donor: In this approach
a class of preferred stock is issued to the extent of the value of the assets contrib-
uted to the corporation. A small class of voting common is retained by the
donor and a larger class of nonvoting common is given to the donees. One of
the uses of this approach is to retain in the ownership of the donor the value of
the assets at their contribution and to retain complete control in his hands, but
to make gifts of the entire growth or inflationary value of the underlying assets.
The use of multiclass stock provides an alternative to restrictive agreements in
controlling the stock voting power.
D. Stock Classification: This uses separate classes of voting common and
nonvoting common without the issuance of preferred stock. By this means the
donor can retain complete control of the corporation but give away the right
to most of the dividends, if any, and preferred participation in liquidation in the
form of the nonvoting common stock. It would appear from Byrum v. United
States " and Yeazel v. Coyle7 that such an approach will not cause the donated
stock to be taxed in the estate of the donor, nor perhaps will the gift of shares of
voting common with an agreement back that the donor shall vote all the stock
cause it to be taxed to the donor.
E. Trust: The donated stock may further be placed in a trust for the objects
of the donor's bounty. This would allow flexibility responsive to future events.
In the event of the death of one of the beneficiaries, the value involved is cor-
56 408 U.S. 125 (1973); reh. den. 409 U.S. 898 (1973), aff'd, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
57 68-1 U.S.T.C. 1 12, 524 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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respondingly reduced in the light of whatever obstacles the intervention of the
trust puts between the donee and the stock. (Some gift tax problems can arise in
this regard as discussed below.) The Byrum and Yeazel cases utilize the device
of placing voting stock in a trust so arranged that the donor could control the
voting of the stock, but would not receive any income or principal distributions.
From the estate planning viewpoint, such an approach allows the donor to divest
of all ownership in the stock, separate income from principal, if desired, and
create future interests in and contingent successions to the corporate stock but still
retain operating control of the business during his lifetime. The estate tax con-
sequences of this method are discussed more fully below.
F. Charitable Remainders: Since the gift of stock lends itself conveniently to
trust treatment or to legal life estates and remainders, charitable remainders after
the life of the immediate beneficiaries can be further used to reduce the estate
tax of the donor's estate.
G. Income Tax Effects: The utility of the trust approach is lessened, how-
ever, for the reason that the Subchapter S selection is not available to a corporation
having a trustee as a shareholder. It may be held that this unfair and discrimina-
tory rule may be alleviated by future legislation. The ABA-treasury committee
on Subchapter S corporations has recommended that the present limitation of ten
shareholders for a Subchapter S option be increased to fifteen, particularly if the
increase is by inheritance. This would help alleviate one of the problems in the
utilization of corporate stock for transmission of property where Subchapter S
status is desired and the descent of the stock might terminate the election by in-
creasing the number of shareholders beyond the statutory limit. The ABA-
treasury committee proposals also include provisions that trusts created by the
donor's stock may be a stockholder without termination of the election and that
the holding of stock in voting trust does not terminate the election. The
proposals contained similar provisions curtailing termination of the election in-
advertently by the holding of stock on a transitory basis by an ineligible stock-
holder, such as a trust. The ABA-treasury proposals further suggest modification
of the rule allowing one class of stockholding only to allow the Subchapter S
option to be available to corporations having classes of nonvoting stock. Congres-
sional adoption of the above proposals would greatly expand the estate planning
utility of the corporate form.
VI. Permissible Retention of Control of Gifted Stock
Recent Revenue rulings and cases have sharply focused on the degree to
which voting control or other benefits can be retained from stock otherwise given
away by the donor without rendering the same liable in the estate of the donor
for estate tax. Use of corporate stock as a medium for the succession to the donor-
testator's assets offers some unique opportunities for the donor to have his cake
and eat it too. Various approaches to the transfer of asset values to others while
retaining some degree of control over the management of the assets involved have,
in certain instances, been approved by the courts even though heavily attacked by
the Internal Revenue Service. The cases approving such transfers and the areas
of attack upon them by the Internal Revenue Service of late are discussed below.
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Transfers of majority stock have been attacked under various circumstances
as being transfers with "possession or enjoyment" of or "right to income from"
retained in the person holding majority control of the corporation-under I.R.C.
2036 (including retention of right to designate persons who shall possess or enjoy
the property in or income from the donated stock).
Reservation in the donor of the right to the dividends from the stock will
render the stock taxable to the donor as being the substantial equivalent of a
life estate under 2036.1 Similarly, an initial endorsement of dividends back to
the transferor by the donee results in such taxability.59 Reservation of an agreed
salary so large as to amount to a reservation of the dividends from the stock given
will cause the stock to be taxed to the donor's estate as above.6" Reservation of a
reasonable salary at a fixed level, even though it is to be paid regardless of
physical condition or inability to serve, does not of itself cause inclusion in the
transferor's estate.61 The application of Section 2036 requires a finding of an
understanding at the time of the gift for the retention of possession, enjoyment, or
income in order to render the gift taxable in the estate of the donor."' The
recent cases seem to indicate a reluctance by the courts to imply such retained
rights in absence of proven express agreements." Earlier cases implied such
agreements from the circumstances surrounding the gift, and the regulations
under 2036 provide that an "interest or right is treated as having been retained or
reserved, if at the time of the transfer there was an understanding express or
implied, that the interest or right would be later conferred."" The question
remains as to how far this approach can be carried into the fact situation where
the retention of control in the hands of the donor gives him complete ability to
control dividends, and corporate history since the gift reflects a salary or interest
payment substantially absorbing the corporate net income. Transfer by gift of
interests having substantial restrictions imposed by arm's length agreements
between the donor and others or imposed upon the donor from previous gratui-
tons transfers should not, of course, render such gifts subject to estate tax in the
estate of the donor. Such gifts are completed when made to the extent of the
quantity of the donor's interest regardless of third party restrictions imposed."
The right to utilize the donated stock as collateral amounts to an ability to
apply its value to the donor's purposes and deprive the donee of the property in
58 Riley, Admrix. v. Meyers, 59-1 U.S.T.C. 1 11, 874 '(D.C.N.Y. 1959).
59 Atkinson v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
60 Estate of Pamela D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), modified, Estate of Pamela
D. Holland, 1 T.C. 564 (1943). A similar result was reached in the Estate of James Gilbert,
14 T.O. 349 (1950), in which case stock conveyed by a sole stockholder to his wife was held
includible in his gross estate where agreements incidental to the transfer gave the corporation
the right to pledge the stock for corporate loans, gave the stock a thirty-day option to repur-
chase the shares in the event of any bona fide offer by a third party for the same, and required
the wife to will any stock owned by her at death to the corporation.
61 Estate of William L. Belknap, 51 P.-H. Tax Ct. Mem. 243 (1951). See also Estate of
William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790 (1945).
62 INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 2036 (a) (2).
63 Estate of Allen D. Gutchess, 46 T.C. 554 (1966); Ehrlich, Current Developments In-
volving Non-Voting Stock in Estate Planning, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX 1275, 1282
(1968).
64 Id. at n. 20 (emphasis supplied).
65 Estate of W.B. Roddenbery, Sr., 49 P.-H. Tax Ct. Mem. 212 (1949).
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the stock. This brings it under 2036(a) (2) as a right to designate who shall
possess or enjoy the property."
Retention by the donor of all voting stock in the corporation with the con-
sequent ability to pay or withhold the payment of dividends has been urged by
the Service as a retention of sufficient control over "possession and enjoyment" to
render the gifted stock taxable. This argument was rejected in Yeazel. In that
case the donor transferred stock to a trust which together with stock retained by
her aggregated enough to control the issuing corporation. Trust income was to be
paid to four beneficiaries, members of her family, and the donor was the trustee
with powers to retain and vote the stock. The court stated "[a]lthough Mrs.
Coyle could have prevented the corporation from paying a dividend, that action
would not have deprived the beneficiaries of the possession or enjoyment of either
the property or income because the retained earnings of the company would
increase... ,"7 The court further stated that the beneficiaries were in a position
to receive the economic benefit of the stock by using it as security to borrow
against it and that they would have the full value when they ultimately received
the stock.
A comparable situation arose later in the Tax Court in Estate of Harry H.
Beckwith."' In that case the decedent created trusts for the benefit of his family
which were funded with stock in his closely held corporation. Periodic payment
of trust income was explicitly provided for, but the decedent retained the right
to remove any trustee and appoint another. At his death the decedent had the
practical ability to vote seventy-four percent of the corporate stock including
proxies given him by the thirty-nine percent of that stock in the family trusts.
(The corporation consistently paid cash dividends.) The commissioner argued
that this ability in the decedent to control the corporation required inclusion of
the stock previously given to the family trust in his estate for federal estate tax
purposes. The Tax Court concluded that there was no prearranged plan giving
the decedent the right to vote the stock and that without this right his ability to
change trustees did not amount to a sufficient retention of powers to create tax-
ability. The Beckwith case is significant beyond its holding since it reflects the
position taken by the commissioner that a clear retention of voting control renders
donated stock taxable.
The arguments adopted by the court in the Yeazel case are the same argu-
ments urged to justify application of the gift tax annual exclusion to gifts of
minority stock having no dividend history. The suggestion that such gifts may
not be susceptible to the annual exclusion was adopted in the recent Tax Court
case of Leonard Rosen." Rosen and his brother were in substantial control of a
family corporation. They each placed stock in the corporation in trust for their
children with the income to be paid until certain ages and the corpus then
66 Estate of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950).
67 68-1 U.S.T.C. 12, 524, at 87, 387 (N.D. I1. E.D. 1968); cf. Chotin v. U.S., 68-1
USTO 12, 522 (CT. CLS.) in which transfers of minority stock within 3 yrs. of death were
ruled to be in contemplation of death for the reason that no dividends were paid on the stock,
the donee therefore received no enjoyment, and the donor must therefore have had pre-
dominant testamentary motivation.
68 55 T.C. 242 (1970).
69 48 T.C. 834 (1967), rev'd Rosen v. Com'r., 397 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1968).
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'delivered. The Fourth Circuit reversed a Tax Court determination that there
.should be no annual exclusion allowed as to the income interests. It was con-
ceded by all parties that the future interest portion of the gift represented by the
-future delivery of corpus to the beneficiaries should not be entitled to an annual
-exclusion. The Fourth Circuit held, however, that actuarial tables should be
-applied to make a valuation of the income interests over the period prior to
'delivery of the corpus even though the stock had no history of dividend payment.
(The court here made reference also to a power in the trustees to sell the stock
-and reinvest the proceeds.) The gift tax problems relating to the annual exclu-
sion are discussed in more detail below. The Tax Court holding that the annual
-exclusion should be denied because the corporation had no dividend history to
make possible valuation of the income interest given is merely another way of
-stating that no real value passes to the donees and would indicate that the line of
thinking urged by the Service in Yeazel is not yet dead. It should be considered
in planning whether the reasoning of the Yeazel case would still prevent taxation
in a situation in which the corporate net income is largely siphoned off in salary,
-where for other reasons there is no accumulation of retained earnings, or where
-the controlling stockholder can prevent the same.
Revenue Ruling 67-54 sets forth the position of the Revenue Service with
xeference to situations where the donor retains complete voting control and con-
trol over the disposition of the donated stock (whether as trustee or alone) that
he has made a transfer with retained right to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the transferred property."0 The position adopted in this ruling
-was urged upon the court in the Yeazel case but rejected for the reason that there
-was no express retention of control over the disposition of the donated stock by
-the donor. The position of this ruling was again urged by the Service in Byrum.
In this case the donor transferred a block of common voting stock in trust for
Iris children. The donor retained the power to vote the stock and the power to
-veto the sale of it by the trustee. The court stated that the term enjoyment is not
a word of art but is synonymous with present substantial economic benefit and
found there to be no such benefit reserved by the donor. The court further
found the transfer not to be taxable as a retention of the right to designate the
person to possess or enjoy the property since the possible beneficiaries were limited
to the children of the donor. This resembles the reasoning applicable to a
marital deduction special power of appointment.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court in Byrum
70 Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 GuM. BULL. 269,
"Where a decedent transfers nonvoting stock in trust and holds for the remainder
of his life voting stock giving him control over the dividend policy of the corporation,
he has retained, for a period of which did not in fact end before his death, the right
to determine the income from the nonvoting stock. If he also retains control over
the disposition of the nonvoting stock, whether as trustee, by restriction upon the
trustee, or alone or in conjunction with another, he has in fact made a transfer
whereby he has retained for his life the right to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the transferred property or the income therefrom. Since under sec-
tion 20.2036-1 (b) (3) of the Estate Tax Regulations it is immaterial in what capa-
city a power was exercisable by the decedent, it is sufficient that the power was exer-
cisable in the capacity of controlling stockholder. Under the facts of this case, there-
fore, the decedent has made a transfer with a reserved power within the meaning of
section 2036 (a) of the Code." (emphasis supplied)
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with a six to three decision, thus opening a way for tax planning based upon
comparable types of voting control retention.
The following aspects of the Supreme Court's decision are particularly im-
portant from a planning point of view:
(a) The reservation of powers of management does not alone constitute a
reservation of possession and enjoyment under section 2036. The Supreme
Court reaffirms that "enjoyment" requires substantial present economic benefit
and relies upon Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company1 to establish that reserved
powers of trust management do not amount to control over the economic benefits
or enjoyment of the property."1'
(b) The Supreme Court killed any lingering doubt as to whether retention
of the right to vote transferred shares requires inclusion within the gross estate. In
doing so, the court distinguished Estate of Holland v. Commissioner71" as involv-
ing a withholding of income until the decedent's death, as well as other rights,
and referred to Yeasel as supporting this viewpoint. The opinion remarks that
the government in its argument conceded that mere retention of the right to
vote shares does not constitute "enjoyment," under section 2036 (a) I,7"- and
the court stated: "Even if Byrum had transferred a majority of the stock, but
had retained voting control, he would not have retained substantial present
economic benefits."
(c) The opinion of the Supreme Court clearly recognizes the differentiation
between holding property through the medium of stock in a closely held, non-
public corporation and other types of property (such as publicly held stock) hav-
ing a ready market. The opinion points out that such close corporations do not
have regular and dependable earnings flow and states "the typical closely held
corporation is small, has a checkered earning record, and has no market for its
shares"71 4 the Court stresses that it would be unfair to allow shareholders of
publicly held corporations to place such stock in an irrevocable trust, and not
allow stockholders of closely held corporations to follow the same course merely
because a retention of management might result." 5
(d) In stressing that the settlor of the trust did not have a retention of
income control the court makes reference to both a trustee's duties to the bene-
ficiaries and a controlling shareholder's duties to his minority stockholders. The
opinion indicates that while a controlling stockholder having power to abuse
his holdings to his own benefit and to the detriment of minority shareholders
might do so, he is nevertheless a fiduciary obligated to act as such. The Supreme
Court's analysis is that taxability is to be determined on the basis of the legal
obligations to the minority shareholders not on the basis of what possibilities for
abuse of power are open to the donor, after the gift.
(e) The majority opinion in Byrum also disposes of the argument that
voting control makes it possible to curtail dividends and thereby accumulate
71 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
71.1 408 U.S. 125, 146 (1973); reh. den. 409 U.S. 898 (1973).
71.2 Estate of Pamela D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564 (1943).
71.3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. § 2036(a) (1).
71.4 408 U.S. 125, 149 (1973).
71.5 Id. at 149 n.34.
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income which augments the value of the donor's retained stock. This power does
not change the economic picture, since the benefit is equally apportioned to the
owners of stock regardless of the control element. The Byrum case still does not
quite reach the fact situation treated of in Ruling 67-54. The ruling relates to the
type of corporation having a capital structure consisting of non-voting preferred
(presumably to the extent of the corporate asset value) retained by the donor, a
small class of voting common, and a much larger class of non-voting common
which constitutes the subject matter of the gift.
In the absence of a restriction on resale of the stock by the donee, the donor's
retention of voting control, even if absolute, does not appear under the above
cases to be sufficient to cause inclusion of the donated stock in his estate. 2 How-
ever, the extent to which restrictive agreements may be coupled with retention
of voting control remains undetermined and should be approached with care.
It has been suggested that Section 2038 could be relied upon by the Service to
attack transfers of stock upon the pattern discussed in Ruling 67-54."J It could be
urged that retention of controlling stock in the immediate family of the donor
following the gift constitutes substantial control and that there should at least be
no reduction in value for lack of control of the stock remaining in the hands of the
donor-decedent. It is of interest to note that the Tax Court in the Estate of
David J. Levenson 4 made specific reference to the total family group control of
stock in valuing the shares in the hands of the deceased. The corporation in-
volved had 2,400 issued shares (unlisted). The decedent owned 155 shares, his
wife and their sons owned 1,475 shares, the wife's relatives owned 406 shares and
a nonrelated stockholder 364. The Service urged adoption of the book value of
the company stock. The court found the value at 92.98% of the book value and
made reference to the factor of strong family control.
Augmentation of value for stock constituting corporate control has been
suggested by the Internal Revenue Service. Ruling 59-60 reflects the position of
the Service in asserting that although it is true that a minority interest in an
unlisted corporation stock is more difficult to sell than a similar block of listed
stock, it is equally certain that control of a corporation, either actual or in effect,
representing as it does an additional element of value may justify a higher value
for a particular block of stock."5 In Revenue Ruling 67-54, with reference to the
effect of degree of control on the value of unlisted stock, it is stated:
Where the block consists of the voting common stock of a corporation, a
substantial portion of the entire value of the common stock is to be attributed
to that block, and hence the per share value of the voting stock should be
relatively larger than the per share value of the nonvoting stock.... Under
Section 2031 of the Code, the value of the nonvoting shares included in the
gross estate should reflect the additional value inherent in the closely held
voting shares by reason of control of the company policies.76
The Internal Revenue Service has advanced this argument to the courts on oc-
72 A.B.A., BULLETIN OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION 444 (Winter, 1968).
73 Ehrlich, supra note 63, at 1278.
74 18 TOM 535, modified, Levenson's Estate v. Comm'r, 282 F.2d 581 (3rd Cir. 1960).
75 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 243.
76 Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 270.
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casion with some success. The highest court passing on this question, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, has agreed with the Service to a degree in the
case of United States v. Parker."7 In that case it was held that shares of a corpo-
ration amounting to eighty percent of its outstanding stock should be valued in
excess of 80% of the corporate asset value, and that family stock should be ag-
gregated under Section 1239(a). In the Estate of Robert Hosken Damon," the
deceased owned 240,801 shares of the common stock of a corporation having
721,765 shares outstanding. The Service argued to the court that the stock had a.
higher value than the market because the block owned by the estate represented
effective control of the corporation. The court did not meet this argument in its
opinion, but found that the stock did not represent either actual or effective con-
trol and did not take this factor into account in valuing.
The following further considerations might be suggested with reference to
the valuation of retained stock, with retained control. Total retention of voting
control would not increase the market value of the shares if this retention is
personal to the donor only. (Retention to the donor, personally, may be a problem
under Section 2036, but is of no interest to a prospective purchaser of the stock,
since he will receive only the voting control inherent in the stock ownership itself.)
The same considerations would apply to restrictions on stock transfer of the gifted
stock if such restrictions are personal to the donor such as the trust restrictions
in the Byrum and Yeazel cases, as opposed to restrictions ruming with the stock.
It may, however, be helpful to the potential purchaser that restrictions running
with the stock will keep the number of other stockholders restricted. Even though
the donor may reserve to himself the power to vote the donated shares, the donees
still have all the rights and remedies of minority stockholders if their position is
abused such as through the payment of excessive salaries to himself by the donor.
The reservation of voting control in the donor allows the perpetuation of himself
as the controlling officer of the corporation, which may be of value to a prospec-
tive purchaser, and allows him to pay or withhold dividends. This last element
would not influence a prospective purchaser very much since it does not affect
either the dividends which he will receive or the retained earnings attributable
to his shares.
VIi. Caveats to Estate Planning Through Incorporation
Use of incorporation as a form for the holding and disposition of assets for
estate planning purposes has its costs and hazards like any other tax avoidance or
property succession arrangement. Estate tax avoidance through deliberate reduc-
tion in stock values is paid for by the owner of the assets involved in terms of
reduction in operating control, loss of income, and loss of ability to liquidate the
assets placed in the corporate form. In concluding whether or not incorporation
is an appropriate part of the estate plan, the following factors should be taken
into account.
A. The unincorporated owner, by giving undivided fractional interests to his
77 376 Fed. 2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967).
78 49 T.C. 108 (1967).
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children, will produce assets to be discounted in his estate even if the gift is made
in the three-year period. Discounts for undivided ownerships in the neighborhood
of fifteen percent are allowed regularly by the courts."9 To the extent the assets
involved lend themselves to the giving of fractional interests, the advantages of
the use of the corporate form are lessened.
B. The incorporated owner suffers the disadvantage after his gifts reach one-
third of the outstanding stock of having no control over liquidation of his opera-
tion, ability to sell it, or even ability to borrow against it without the consent of his
minority stockholders.
C. The incorporated owner is subject to all the hazards of outstanding
minority stock particularly in the event of any falling out among the family.
Minority stockholders have various rights for the protection of their stock value
such as inspection of the corporate books, dividends to the extent of available
income, etc., which can be of great harassment to the majority stockholder.
D. The incorporated owner is subject to the costs of operating in corporate
form and the nuisance of annual reports to the state.
E. The incorporated owner, who makes any substantial amount of gifts, is
in effect locked into the corporation so long as he lives and loses the flexibility of
control over his operation and its assets which the unincorporated owner making
his gifts in kind retains.
F. Effect of the above factors can be reduced through voting right retention
by the donor to the extent that retention of voting control by him can take place
without frustrating his objectives and to the extent permitted by the estate tax
cases discussed above.
VIII. Corporate Stock Gifts and the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion
In planning any gift program involving minority shares in a family corpora-
tion the availability of the $3,000.00 annual exclusion per donee can be of
crucial importance."0 The present gift tax cost of a particular program as op-
posed to the estate tax avoided in the future is a central factor in the decision of
whether to pursue a particular gift program and of what form gifts are to be
made in. The methods of giving such stock are generally:
1. Outright gift of ownership from the donor to the donee;
2. Gift of ownership subject to various restrictive agreements limiting
the right of the donee to resell the stock or providing for repurchase
upon certain contingencies, by other stockholders or the corporation;
and
3. Gift of the stock into a trust with the income assigned to certain donee
79 A discount of fifteen percent from the pro rata share of market value was allowed in
the valuation of an undivided one-third interest in real estate in William R. Stewart, Jr.,
Et Al., Executors, 31 B.T.A. 201 (1934). Upon proof showing that market discounting of
undivided fractional interests in real estate was common practice in the community, a discount
of twelve and one-half percent was allowed in Estate of Nina M. Campanari, 5 T.C. 488
(1945).
80 INT. Rav. CODE of 1954 § 2503 (1972).
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or donees and the remainder following the life or lives of the income
beneficiaries, then to others (other forms of future interest owner-
ship of stock, such as life estate and remainder, would be treated for
gift tax purposes the same as the trust situation).
Peculiar problems in this context arise with close corporation stock as contrasted
with stock in a publicly held corporation. Publicly held stock having a regular
dividend history and an established market readily lends itself to the calculation
of value transmitted to income beneficiaries, and its value is readily capable of
ascertainment. Close corporation stock, on the other hand, normally has no
regular dividend history, and normally has no established value in the market
place.
Gift tax exclusions for gifts of close corporation stock have been attacked
by the Revenue Service, in some situations, on the grounds that income interests,
as such, are incapable of valuation without a dividend history; close corporation
stock given outright is not sufficiently susceptible of definite valuation as to allow
the annual exclusion; and in certain circumstances such gifts may be future
interests not susceptible to the exclusion. In the Rosen case, previously dis-
cussed, the Revenue Service argued that the lack of dividend history in the
corporate stock placed in trust by the taxpayer made valuation of the interest
given to the income beneficiaries impossible and that they should therefore be
denied the annual exclusion."' The Circuit Court, instead, held that the principal
value of the stock should be determined and the income interest of the income
beneficiaries actuarially calculated from that regardless of the dividend history.
The court stressed that the trustees had the power to sell the stock and reinvest
the proceeds in other forms of investment.
It has been noted that occasionally examining agents will even take the
position that the annual exclusion should not be allowed on outright gifts where
there is no dividend history for the reason that the value to the donee is not
capable of being determined. In consideration of this subject, the case of Her-
inger v. Commissioner2 should be carefully considered. The Heringer case in-
volved, in essence, the creation of a corporation by two brothers with issuance of
stock forty percent to the brothers and sixty percent to their children. The initial
contribution of capital was cash. The following year the brothers transferred farm-
lands to the corporation, which leased the land back to a partnership comprised
of certain of the children of the brothers. The Circuit Court stated that they
would not decide the point of whether the gifts were, in substance, to the donors'
children or to the corporation for purposes of determining the number of annual
exclusions allowable for the reason that even though the children be deemed
donees, the interests taken by them would be "future interests."
The Circuit Court based this conclusion on the case of Ryerson v. Unfted
States,8 which involved a gift to a trust having two beneficiaries who were also
81 48 T.C. 834 '(1967), revz4 Rosen v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1968), cf. Stark
v. U.S. (W.D. Mo. 1972). Gifts of close corporation stock paying no dividends should not be
allowed annual exclusion to the life beneficiaries of a trust of the stock, by reason of lack of
susceptibility to valuation.
82 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1956).
83 312 U.S. 405 (1941).
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trustees; by the terms of the trust, both had to agree to any distribution of income
or corpus. The Circuit Court reasoned, since the declaration of dividends from
the corporation required the joint action of the stockholders, which action no
single stockholder could perform, the gift was necessarily a future interest as to
each individual donee-stockholder.
This reasoning would appear to be, in its nature, an application of the ap-
proach taken by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Fondren v.
Commissioner.84 The key language is: "Whatever puts the barrier of a substantial
period between the will of the beneficiary or donee now to enjoy what has been
given him and that enjoyment makes the gift one of a future interest." 5 This
principle fully applied in the trust situation from which it arose results in the sep-
arate handling of income and principal, reflected in the Gift Tax Regulations.
They hold that an "unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession or enjoy-
ment of property or the income from property is a present interest in property."8
As stated in LaFortune v. Commissioner:
Separate and independent consideration must be given to the gift of the
corpus and to the gift of the income. If the income of a trust is required to
be distributed periodically, as annually, but distribution of the corpus is
deferred, the gift of the income is one of a present interest and the gift of the
corpus is one of a future interest.8 7
The appropriate analysis of the applicability of the annual exclusion to such
gifts follows.
The trust situation, if it does not involve a required periodic distribution of
income, is inevitably a situation of potentially postponed enjoyment. If the bene-
ficiary may not upon his own decision require present income benefit or present
payment of corpus, he necessarily has nothing of present economic value; i.e.,
he does not have a marketable ownership. It seems inevitable that the annual
exclusion should be denied in such a situation since the beneficiary's interest in
the gift is incapable of market valuation and incapable of being sold or reduced to
cash by the beneficiary as to the income right. A deferral of right to corpus is
within the common law definition of "future interest" and disallowance of an-
nual exclusion as to it is within the literal meaning of Section 2503 (b)."
A gift of property to a corporation, as in the Heringer situation, is in some
respects analogous to a gift of property into a preexisting trust, and the reasoning
of the Ninth Circuit is, apparently, that the stockholder's position is like that of
a beneficiary who cannot reach the actual subject of the transfer.
The gift of a share of corporate stock itself, as the subject of the gift, is
economically, logically, and legally a different matter. A share of corporate stock
is a discrete item of property in itself having a cash market value. The appre-
hended difficulty of securing dividend income on such a share is merely one of
the factors affecting its market value. It certainly does not render the stock in-
84 324 U.S. 18 '(1945).
85 Id. at 20-21.
86 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503-1(b).
87 263 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1958).
88 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
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capable of valuation or disabled from marketability, as the beneficiary's interest
in trust corpus may well be. The logical separation of income and corpus, utilized
in approaching problems of trust law, is completely inapplicable to a treatment
of corporate shares as such since every legal right attaching to the corporate share,
after a direct gift of it without reservation, is wholly in the hands of the donee.
It is apparent from the above-cited authorities that the problem of annual
exclusion for a given gift is necessarily interwoven with the susceptibility of that
gift to valuation. Where the species of property right involved is not one neces-
sarily, by its own terms, having enjoyment postponed into the future (such as a
remainder interest after a life estate) the "barrier to enjoyment" test of the
Fondren case may be, with the same results, cast in terms of whether the
particular property right involved is susceptible of market valuation or whether
it contains such contingencies as to be incapable of such. Necessarily, a property
right which has a barrier between the desire of the beneficiary and his capability
of enjoying it will be of much less value than a "present interest." It is interesting
that the court in the Heringer case goes to great lengths to avoid committing
itself on the question of what the valuation of the property right received by the
ultimate donees would be. The court delicately phrases its opinion to state that
the Gift Tax would not apply to the forty percent interest retained by the
donors but does not commit itself otherwise.
In summary, it would appear that the right of a donee-stockholder to exer-
cise every possible aspect of control over the stock share or shares received by him,
his present ability to reduce the same to cash in the market place, and the lack of
any barrier existing between the stockholder's desire to realize the benefit of his
stock and his ability to do so renders the stock a present interest, eligible for an-
nual exclusion. The stockholder in such a situation is well within the classic
language of Curry v. McCanless, which states that a present power of disposi-
tion for one's own benefit is the equivalent of ownership.89 In utilizing any
trust or future interest arrangement, the Rosen case should be carefully examined
to assure that the maximum annual exclusions are obtained. Before contributing
additional property to a corporation from which stock has been given, the prob-
lems created by the Heringer case should be carefully considered. It would ap-
pear that such a contribution of capital does constitute a gift if no stock is received
by the donor in exchange for it and that such a gift would have no annual ex-
clusion available to it. In this situation, therefore, the donor should first con-
tribute property to the corporation in exchange for stock at its proper valuation
and then make gift of the stock to such donees as he desires to have it.
IX. Audit Review of Estate Tax Returns Involving Close Corporation Stock
It is typical of Revenue Service practice at the examining agent level to
allow no discounts as such in the valuation of corporate stock in a close corpora-
tion. With the examining agent, audit is typically approached by negotiation of
the values of the underlying assets until either a result satisfactory to the taxpayer
from that approach is obtained or the audit is closed on an unagreed basis.
89 307 U.S. 357, 371 (1939).
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Typically at the Conference Staff level, negotiation can proceed with regard to
application of valuation factors to individual stockholdings related to their
percentage of outstanding stock and the effect of this on marketability of the
holding. The factor that is difficult for both the Revenue Service and the tax-
payer to clearly incorporate in audit settlement discussions is that of the realistic
market possibility for minority stockholdings in such corporations. For example,
the holding of the taxpayer in the Katz case9 of one-fifth of the outstanding stock
of the corporation involved was essentially unmarketable; and the Tax Court
concluded to discount it to fifty percent of its proportionate value of the under-
lying assets for that reason. In such situations there is usually a family group
identity involved among the stockholders of the corporation and an implicit feel-
ing, at least on the part of the estate tax examiner, that the minority stockholder
is largely under the control of the donor-testator from whom his stockholding
originated. For this reason, examiners and conferees are reluctant to allow valu-
ations really reflective of what the minority stockholding could actually be sold
for. Representatives of the taxpayer are, on the other hand, often reluctant to
pursue the valuation situation too far in view of the possibility of coming up
against arguments that collusive situations rendering the gift taxable under §
2036 as one with possession and enjoyment retained might be encountered.
The Revenue Service has established no coherent position in approaching
these situations. It is conceivable that attempts might be made to extend the
concept of controlled stock (stock owned by a taxpayer's family group) to the
estate tax area.91 It is possible that attempts may be made to tax the decedent
on all family group stock deriving from gifts by the decedent as if it formed a part
of his holdings at the date of his death. To date no such position has been taken
by the Revenue Service. This possibility should be at least considered, however,
in the course of estate planning; and certainly every attempt should be made to
eliminate even the appearance of collusive arrangements for the control of gifted
stock by the donor, other than explicit arrangements to the extent approved by
the courts.
Conclusion
The close corporation, like the trust, provides a method for separating the
management of property from the ownership of property. It is this separation of
management and ownership which is the essential element of the utility of trusts
in both asset management and tax planning. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice
Powell in Byrum recognizes that the same separation of management and
ownership ("substantial present economic benefit") may obtain in the corporate
form."2 The corporation is generally more appropriate than the trust in adminis-
tering and allocating the benefit of business assets, as opposed to assets of a more
static investment nature, and should take its place as an appropriate estate plan-
ning medium when business assets are involved.
90 68 P.-H. Tax Ct. Mem. at 190.
91 Estate of David J. Levenson, 18 T.C.M. 535, modified, 282 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1960)
provides an example of aa application of the "family group" concept in another context.
92 408 U.S. 125, 149 (1973), reh. den. 409 U.S. 898 (1973).
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